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Abstract:
We examine how the Banking Acts of the 1933 and 1935 and related New Deal legislation influenced
risk taking in the financial sector of the U.S. economy. Our analysis focuses on contingent liability of
bank owners for losses incurred by their firms and how the elimination of this liability influenced
leverage and lending by commercial banks. Using a new panel data set that compares balance sheets
of state and national banks, we find contingent liability reduced risk taking, particularly when coupled
with rules requiring banks to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Leverage ratios are
higher in states with limited liability for bank owners. Banks in states with contingent liability
converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could sustain larger loan losses (as a
fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. The New Deal replaced a regime of
contingent liability with stricter balance sheet regulation and increased capital requirements, shifting
the onus of risk management from banks to state and federal regulators. By separating investment
banks from commercial banks, the Glass-Steagall Act left investment banks to manage their own
leverage, a feature of financial regulation that, in part, depended on their partnership structure.
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This essay examines how the Banking Acts of the 1933 and 1935 and related New Deal 
legislation influenced risk taking in the financial sector of the U.S. economy. The analysis 
focuses on contingent liability of bank owners for losses incurred by their firms and how the 
elimination of this liability influenced leverage and lending by commercial banks. Using a new 
panel data set, we find contingent liability reduced risk taking. In states with contingent liability, 
banks used less leverage and converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could 
survive larger loan losses (as a fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. In 
states with limited liability, banks took on more leverage and risk, particularly in states that 
required banks with limited liability to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In the 
long run, the New Deal replaced a regime of contingent liability with deposit insurance, stricter 
balance sheet regulation, and increased capital requirements, shifting the onus of risk 
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A defining characteristic of the recent financial crisis was the rise in leverage of 
financial institutions, a feature that fueled the size of the eventual calamity. Since the 
crisis, policy makers, pundits, and scholars have asked whether requiring financiers to 
risk more of their own funds along with their firms, i.e. “keeping more skin in the game,” 
would limit risk taking by financial institutions. We address this question by examining 
commercial banking from 1910 through 1955, and by focusing our attention on key 
regulatory changes related to risk taking that arose as part of the New Deal of the 1930s. 
Prior to the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, most commercial bankers were personally 
liable for losses in the event that their bank failed. This contingent liability applied to the 
directors, chief executive officers, chief financial officers, and stockholders of all national 
and most state chartered banks. During the New Deal, legislative reforms eliminated 
contingent liability for most national and state banks.  
The New Deal banking reforms had long-lasting consequences that may have 
contributed to the leveraging and risk taking that fueled the credit boom of the 2000s. We 
focus on how New Deal banking legislation from the mid-1930s altered incentives for 
financial firms to manage their risk, shifted oversight of commercial banks to new federal 
agencies, and left the oversight of risk in investment banks to themselves or to regulatory 
agencies with little existing experience or authority to manage it. 
Our estimation strategy exploits variation in liability laws across states and 
variation in changes in these laws over time to identify the influence of contingent 
liability on risk taking by banks. Using a new panel data set, we find contingent liability 
reduced risk taking. In states with contingent liability, banks used less leverage and 
converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could sustain larger loan losses 
(as a fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. In states with limited 
liability, banks had more leverage and risk, particularly in states that required banks with 
limited liability to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The New Deal 
replaced a regime of contingent liability with stricter balance sheet regulation and 
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increased capital requirements, shifting the onus of risk management from banks to state 
and federal regulators.  
Our analysis begins with an examination of the different liability regimes that 
applied to commercial banks, the reforms of the New Deal, and theoretical reasons why 
liability laws influenced risk-taking by banks. Section III describes the new data set that 
we use to estimate the effects of contingent liability, including detailed information on 
the liability laws commercial bankers faced in each state. We track changes in regulatory 
regimes at the state and national level from 1910 through 1955. We combine this 
regulatory information with state-level aggregates on the balance sheets of banks. Section 
IV uses the panel data to analyze the effects of bank liability laws and finds that, when 
contingent liability existed, it deterred risk taking. Section V concludes by discussing the 
long-run consequences of the financial reforms of the 1930s for the U.S. financial system. 
 
II. Contingent Liability 
 
A. Background 
In an effort to reform the present structure of financial regulation, policymakers 
have looked back at the pivotal legislation of the 1930s for guidance. Some 
commentators have argued that the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 set the U.S. financial 
system on a trajectory of safety and stability that promoted long-run growth in the 
economy; it is argued that the virtues of Depression-era regulation were stripped away 
when banking reform began in the 1990s.
1
 Others have cast the 1930s legislation as a 
misdiagnosis of the underlying problems of the 1930s (Kroszner, 1998), and a 
continuance of practices (i.e., unit banking, and the Real Bills Doctrine) or extension of 
them (deposit insurance) that undermine financial stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
2006; Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven 2009; Calomiris 2008a, 2011). In this paper, 
we revisit the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 to shine new light on changes that affected 
the incentives and risk taking of financial firms.  
By the 1830s, most states had passed laws limiting the liability of non-banking 
corporations (Oesterle, 1992). Until the 1930s, however, limited liability was the 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Kuttner (2007) and Stiglitz (2009).  
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exception rather than the rule. Between the Civil War and the Great Depression, most 
states had laws that made stock holders responsible for a portion of the bank’s debts 
when banks failed. Contingent liability gained a further foothold when the National 
Banking Act made double liability a requirement for national banks:  
 
“The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held 
individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not for one another, for all 
contracts, debts, and engagements of such association to the extent of the 
amount of their stock therein, at the par value of, in addition to the amount 
invested in such shares…” (U.S. Revised Statutes sec. 5151 (1875) 12 
U.S.C., sec.63) 
 
Double liability meant that if banks failed, stockholders would lose the amount invested 
in the stock (due to the failure) and, if assets were insufficient to payoff creditors and 
depositors, stockholders were held responsible for an additional sum not exceeding the 
par value of their stock. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the system 
of double liability was vigorously enforced; more than 50 U.S. Supreme Court rulings 
and hundreds more in state and local courts affirmed its validity. The federal enforcement 
of double liability recovered $68.4 million dollars between 1865 and 1934, a significant 
fraction (28.3%) of total losses to all creditors of failed national banks during that period 
(Macey and Miller, 1992, p.57). 
 A large portion of these recoveries came out of the pockets of key decision 
makers at commercial banks. A bank’s top corporate officer, then referred to as president 
and cashier, and now known as chief executive officer and chief financial officer, sat on 
the board of directors. Federal law required all members of the board of directors to own 
a minimum of $1,000 dollars in stock (at par value), and most state laws had similar 
provisions. Laws in some states required directors to hold larger stakes. In Iowa, for 
example, each director of a state bank with capital above $50,000 had to hold 5% of the 
outstanding shares (Garlock, 1926). Because stocks tended to be concentrated in small 
numbers of individuals, many directors and officers ended up owning more stock than the 
minimum (Manfrini, 1959).
2
 This concentrated pattern of stock holding aligned the 
                                                 
2
 This pattern resembled the pattern for small corporations in the United States from the 1930s through the 
1950s (Perlo 1952). By the 1930s, dispersed stock ownership shifted control of the largest firms in the 
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incentives of owners and managers, creating considerable overlap between these two 
groups. When coupled with double-liability legislation, it ensured the decision-makers 
kept substantial “skin in the game.” 
The number of states with double liability continued to expand in the first decades 
of the 20
th
 century. In 1910, 31 states imposed double liability on bank stockholders. 
Colorado (triple liability) and California (unlimited liability) imposed even higher limits 
(Vincens, 1957). Apparently, in reaction to the panic of 1907, several states moved to 
double liability. Nevada and New Hampshire did so in 1911. Arizona, Arkansas, and 
Oregon changed in 1912, and Mississippi imposed it in 1914 (White, 2013). By contrast, 
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled double liability unconstitutional in that state in 1923. In 
1929, on the eve of the Great Depression, double liability (or greater) existed in 38 states. 
Table 1 outlines these patterns. The column “Status 1910” indicates the liability that a 
state imposed on the banks that it chartered. The column “begin” indicates the year that a 
state with limited liability in 1910 imposed double liability on the outstanding capital 
stock of all banks chartered in the state and all subsequent issues of bank capital. In states 
that do not appear in the table, limited liability prevailed in 1910 and thereafter. 
 
B. How does Contingent Liability Influence Risk Taking? 
According to most scholars, contingent liability emerged as a way to protect 
depositors from “risk shifting.” Depositors are at an informational disadvantaged relative 
to shareholders, who know more about the particular assets held by banks. Contingent 
liability puts more equity at stake for stockholders and has the effect of making them stay 
on the linear portion of their payoff matrix over a greater range of outcomes (Esty, 1998). 
By reining in moral hazard, contingent liability potentially reduces the incidence of bank 
failures and the size of losses incurred by depositors and unsecured creditors. Moreover, 
since creditors know that banks will act with less risk, they may in turn offer banks lower 
cost funds (Kane and Wilson, 1996, Esty, 1998).  
Empirical evidence suggests that during the national banking era double liability 
reined in risk taking. For example, Macey and Miller (1992) show that from 1913-1928, 
                                                                                                                                                 
United States from owners (i.e. stockholders) to managers. For the largest member banks, that shift 
occurred during the 1950s (Vernon 1970, US Congress 1963a, 1963b, 1966). 
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voluntary liquidations for national banks outpaced involuntary liquidations by a ratio of 
nearly three to one. Macey and Miller (1992) also show that recovery rates from failed 
banks with double-liability exceeded recovery rates from failed banks with limited 
liability. Using aggregate data from four U.S. states, Esty (1998) shows that the number 
of new banks declines monotonically with increased liability during the period 1900-
1919. These studies, of course, examine indirect proxies for leverage and risk-taking. Our 
essay is the first that directly analyses these issues. 
 
C. Legislative Changes in the 1930s 
If double liability appeared to protect depositors and creditors and limited risk 
taking by banks, why did it then disappear? Vincens (1957) suggests that, with the 
Depression and waves of failures, the costs became too great. Once bank failures began 
en masse, depositors had little recourse for securing claims against shareholders as many 
of them were already in serious financial difficulty. As a result, assessments placed on 
national bank shareholders never amounted to more than 49.8 percent. Moreover, during 
the 1920s, bank stock ownership broadened considerably. Many of these new 
stockholders purchased shares of bank stock during the equities boom of the 1920s. 
Others inherited shares from parents and grandparents who had been associated with the 
bank in the past. This gradually growing class of shareholders lacked an insider 
connection to the failing bank and had little or no ability to monitor the bank’s behavior, 
yet they faced assessment; and unlike bank executives, these shareholders may not have 
fully considered the implications of stock ownership of banks with contingent liability 
(Macey and Miller, 1992). It was also believed that the threat of contingent liability being 
enforced when banks became insolvent was thought to be depressing bank share prices in 
the 1930s, thus weakening banks’ desire to maintain the system in the face of significant 
macroeconomic distress (Vincens, 1957). At the trough of the depression, policymakers 
and bankers frequently emphasized the need to recapitalize the financial system. Double 
liability may have impeded this goal as it deterred investors from purchasing stocks in 
new or struggling banks. It may have also prevented the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation from purchasing preferred stocks in banks.  
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Kane and Wilson (1996) suggest that regulatory and/or economic shocks can 
lower the value of unlimited liability. They suggest that the private interest theory of 
regulation helps account for the demise of double liability in the 1930s, arguing that the 
benefits that had once accrued to stockholders of large national banks and large state-
chartered banks in double liability states evaporated in the early 1930s. Since all banks 
potentially benefited from decreased expenses associated with monitoring, the passage of 
federal deposit insurance reduced depositors’ future claims and left little support from 
banks for maintaining contingent liability.  
As bank failures mounted in the 1930s and the financial system wound its way 
toward collapse in 1933, public opinion began to turn against double liability as a way of 
protecting depositors and minimizing failures. Limiting risk taking of owners through 
contingent liability provided little cover for depositors facing a large and prolonged 
macroeconomic shock because it did not ensure that depositors would be compensated 
(even partially) at a time in the future when shareholders might be able to pay. In 1933, 
Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act and National Banking Act and removed 
double liability from shares issued after June 16
th
, 1933. This provision went into effect 
after July 1, 1937, and required national banks to give six-months notice of its intention 
to end double liability (49 STAT. 708 (1935), 12 U. S. C., sec. 64a). Then, in 1935, 
Congress further amended the National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve Act, 
permitting (but not requiring) national banks to eliminate double liability on all shares.  
Having weakened depositor protections, legislators sought new alternatives to 
replace contingent liability. Foremost among the new policies to protect depositors was 
the creation of federal deposit insurance, initially enacted in 1933. The 1933 and 1935 
acts also moved to strengthen capital requirements to ensure that banks had “skin in the 
game.” Hearings on the Banking Act of 1935 highlight the reorientation of risk 
management toward the use of regulatory capital standards and surplus. Anticipating that 
legislators were moving in this direction, the Comptroller of Currency noted in his 1934 
Annual Report that “in the event that it is determined to completely eliminate this 
assessment of liability on shareholders, it is suggested that serious consideration be given 
to providing for increasing the surplus of national banking associations until same equals 
the amount of common stock, thereby restoring to the bank’s creditors the protection now 
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given by the potential assessment liability of the shareholders and maintaining a sound 
banking structure.” In testimony on the Banking Act of 1935, the Comptroller again 
advocated that surplus should equal 100 percent of capital.
3
 As a result, Congress 
modified the national banking act, doubling the minimum capital of $25,000 for new 
banking corporations (48 STAT. 185, 12 U.S. C. A.  51 (1933) and mandating that every 
national bank retain 10 per cent of its net earnings until the surplus equaled the total 
outstanding common capital stock (49 STAT. 712 (1935), 12 U. S. C., sec. 60). 
With the termination of double liability for national and Fed member banks, 
pressure mounted for states to eliminate contingent liability for state-chartered banks. In 
order to avoid losing chartered banks, many states responded quickly and passed limited 
liability laws; others lagged, often because of the need to amend state constitutions. The 
last three columns of Table 1 show how states changed bank liability laws. 35 states 
removed double-liability from new and existing bank stock. 30 states changed liability on 
new and existing bank stock with the changes taking effect within the same calendar 
year. Five states reduced liability on the issuance of new bank stocks a year or more 
before reducing liability on existing bank stock. One state, Vermont, authorized limited 
liability for bank stocks issued after March 24, 1935, but retained double liability on all 
bank stock issued before that date. 
States altering double-liability laws often simultaneously changed other rules that 
affected bank risk taking. At least 15 states eliminated double liability only for banks that 
joined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). At least 12 states eliminated 
double liability only for banks that met increased requirements for retained surplus. At 
least 16 required banks seeking to eliminate double liability to notify depositors in 
advance, either in person, through the mail, or by advertising in newspapers.
4
 Double 
liability then lapsed after a waiting period ranging from one to six months. The latter was 
the most common, and was the waiting period required of national banks and of banks in 
the state of New York. Articles published in major newspapers on 2 July 1937 noted that 
most prominent national banks published notices of intent to terminate double liability as 
                                                 
3
 United States Congress. House of Representatives. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency 
on H. R. 5357 (Banking Act of 1935),74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 147-8  
4
 The preceding sentences begin with the phrase “at least” because, at present, we lack a complete 
accounting of all changes in state banking rules and practice that accompanied changes in double-liability.  
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soon as possible and terminated double liability on the first day possible. In the dozen 




Though it sounded the death knell for contingent liability, the Banking Acts of 
1933 and 1935 and their state counterparts did not formally abolish it. Pursuant to the 
creation of the FDIC and subsequent legislative revisions, depositors waived their rights 
to contingent liability upon receiving payment via deposit insurance (52 STAT. 442 
(1938), 12 U. S. C., sec. 264 (1)(7); repealed and reenacted by 64 STAT. 873 (1950), 12 







To understand the impact of removing contingent liability from the banking 
system, we create a panel data set of legal changes and aggregate balance sheet data at 
the state level for the U.S. banking system from 1910 through 1955.  
Our panel concerning double liability legislation extends the work of previous 
scholars, particularly Marquis and Smith (1937), Vincens (1957), Macey and Miller 
(1992), and Grossman (2007).
7
 We collect information from those scholars and additional 
sources including: the NBER/University of Maryland State Constitutions Database; 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, Wesley Smith, “The March of Finance,” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1937, p. A17. 
6
  “In the case of each association which has not caused notice of termination of liability to be published 
prior to May 18, 1953, the Comptroller of the Currency shall cause such notice to be published in the 
manner provided in this section, and on the date six months subsequent to such publication by the 
Comptroller of the Currency such additional liability shall cease.” (67 STAT. 27 (1953), 12 U. S. C., sec. 
64a.) 
7
 Grossman (2007) provides data on states with double liability in 1870, 1900, and 1930. Macey and Miller 
(1992) provide information on (i) states that possessed double liability in the years 1912 and 1931 and (ii) 
states that abolished double liability by 1944. Marquis and Smith (1937) describe the evolution of state 
legislation before 1930, the status of all states laws in 1930, and the legislative changes that occurred in 
most states (including requirements for opting out of double liability) through the end of 1936. Vincens 
(1957) provides a table indicating the “available methods of terminating liability” for states that had not 
abolished it as of 1956 (Vincens 1957 pp.277-8). For most states, Vincens’ table provides the constitutional 
provision or legal code pertaining to double liability and information about the requirements for opting out 
of double liability, such as joining the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or giving public notice of 
termination of liability. The listed requirements, however, is not exhaustive, and the table does not indicate 
the initial date on which the state allowed (or forced) banks to abandon double liability. Instead, the table 
cites the date of the statute currently in force. Arkansas, for example, eliminated double liability for new 
bank stock in 1933 and for bank stock already outstanding in 1935. 
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Bankers Magazine (“In the Months News,” a column that we checked for each month 
from 1933 through 1940); the Banking Law Journal (“Banking Legislative Trends in the 
States” and “Banking Decisions,” two columns which we checked in every issue from 
1933 through 1955); the Wall Street Journal (in particular, articles on 15 May 1936, 9 
March 1937, 30 June 1939); the New York Times (particularly articles 16 August 1936, 
27 May 1938); and Paton’s Digest of Legal Opinions (1926 Edition and 1946 
Supplement).  
These sources enable us to date adoptions and departures from double-liability 
regimes. Dating adoptions tends to be easy and clear. In almost all cases, states adopted 
contingent liability for the stock of all banks chartered in their state at an instant in time 
rather than phasing in double liability slowly over time. The additional liability came into 
effect soon after passage of the act or at beginning of next calendar year.  
Dating departures from contingent liability is a bit less straightforward, and 
potentially complicates our analysis. First, the Federal government and some state 
governments initially eliminated double liability for newly issued bank stock and later for 
all bank stock. Vermont eliminated double liability only for newly issued bank stock, and 
as of 1955, had not eliminated liability for outstanding stock. Second, in most cases, 
provisions associated with its elimination usually came into effect between one month 
and one year after the legal change. Third, participation in the program was optional. 
Banks could choose to opt out of double liability. Doing so required them to provide 
public notice, ranging from one month to six months prior to the cessation of liability. A 
non-member, non-FDIC state bank’s decision to change its liability status was almost 
always voluntary; it was ubiquitous, but not universal. Most state and national banks gave 
notice immediately. This was noted in articles in major newspapers near the date that 
double liability ceased for outstanding shares of national and many state chartered 
banks.
8
 Almost all banks opted out of double liability eventually. In 1953, “all but 25 out 
of almost 5,000 national banks had published the required notice and opted out of double 
liability (Macey and Miller, 1992, pp. 38-9).” By 1957, all but 96 state-chartered banks 
had given notice and opted out of double liability (Vincens, 1957, p. 277). 
                                                 
8
 For example, see Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1937. 
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Because of these complications, we date define a state’s departure from double 
liability in as the first year in which all of the state-chartered banks in state had 
opportunity to opt out of double liability for all existing stock prior to July 15 of that 
year. In states without the opt out provision, we date the end of double liability to the 
year in which laws eliminated double liability for banks before July 15. July is the cutoff 
because our balance sheet information comes from the banks’ spring call report, typically 
collected on the last business day in June. 
Balance sheet data are from All Bank Statistics, United States, 1896 to 1955.
9
 All 
Bank Statistics reports data from bank balance sheets aggregated by state and year. The 
data originated with balance sheets indicating the state of financial institutions at their 
spring call, which usually came near the end of June, and which the federal (and most 
state governments) fixed in the early twentieth century as the last business day in the 
month of June. The data represent aggregates of the balance sheets of all banks in a state. 
When we report figures on total equity, therefore, we are reporting the total equity of all 
banks in a state. When we analyze the asset-equity ratio (often referred to as leverage or 
balance-sheet leverage), we are analyzing the average asset-equity ratio of all banks in a 
state, which is calculated by summing the assets of all banks in a state and dividing that 
sum by the sum of the equity of all banks in a state.
10
 
IV. Contingent Liability and Risk Taking 
 
                                                 
9
 This publication represents a retrospective study conducted by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency during the 
1950s. It employed data from materials previously published by state and federal regulators, from state and 
federal archives, and from privately printed bankers’ directories. The archival and private sources enabled 
investigators to fill gaps in existing series. Some of these gaps were substantial. The State of New York, for 
example, did not collect call reports from state chartered banks during the years 1933 and 1934. All Bank 
Statistics’ data concerning these institutions in those years is interpolated. We analyze only those series that 
were accurately and consistently measured throughout our study period. We examine data collected from 
FRASER’s online database and data digitized by Mark Flood, which are available via the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (Flood 1998).  
10
 Note that to compute values for state-chartered banks, we subtract values for national banks from values 
for all banks using Flood (1998). For seventeen states, this procedure lumps together data on state-chartered 
commercial banks, state-chartered mutual savings banks, state-chartered trust companies, and private 
(unchartered) banks. Mutual savings banks played a minor role in the financial systems for nine of the 
seventeen states where data cannot be separated. For eight states (CT, ME, MD, MA, NJ, NY, RI, VT), 
mutual savings banks feature more prominently. To ensure that differences at the state level in the reported 
financial institutions does not influence our statistical results, we replicate all calculations, figures, and 
tables excluding those eight states excluding these states. Excluding those states does not alter our main 
findings. 
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A. Time Series Evidence from Bank Balance Sheets 
 Our empirical strategy focuses on the microeconomic consequences of contingent 
liability laws by examining bank balance sheet characteristics as outcome variables. We 
compare the experience of state-chartered banks operating in states with and without 
double liability to the experience of national banks operating in those same states. We 
exploit the variation in double-liability laws across states, within states over time, and 
between states and the national banking system. This variation enables us to identify the 
effects of contingent liability on bank risking and to separate contingent liability’s 
influence from confounding variables, state-specific factors, and changes in the economic 
and financial system.  
 Figure 1 displays the number of states subject to double liability on owners’ 
equity, the total number of banks in the United States, and the total number of banks 
subject to double liability. A small number of states adopted double liability at the 
beginning of our panel. Most states eliminated double liability in the late 1930s. The 
number of banks under contingent liability peaked about a decade after the last state 
adopts double liability. The initial peak in the number of banks under double liability, and 
the initial decline in the number of banks under double liability, reflected trends in the 
total number of banks in the United States. Both fell rapidly during the 1920s and 1930s. 
During this period, the proportion of banks under double liability remained roughly 
constant. After 1935, the fraction declined rapidly, as states switch their double liability 
regimes.  
 Figure 2 plots average leverage for state and nationally-chartered banks from 
1910-1955.
11
 Following standard financial accounting, we define the ratio as the bank’s 
assets divided owners’ equity, which is the sum of the book value of paid up capital, 
surplus, undivided profits, unpaid dividends, and all other retained earnings on the 
balance sheet (other than reserves for losses and liabilities for future expenditures, such 
                                                 
11
 To be precise, we calculate the state level averages, and then plot the average across all states. We focus 
on this average of averages because it illustrates the variation which our statistical methods exploit: the 
variation in averages across states. Directly calculating the national average or calculating an average of 
state averages weighted by the assets of banks in each state yield similar time series variation to what is 




 This definition permits us to compute leverage directly from bank balance 
sheets; since regulators collected these data, they are readily available for our sample 
period.
13
 The ratio thus indicates how many dollars a bank invests (in financial and 
physical assets) for each dollar that its owners invested in the firm.  
 Figure 2 shows that at the beginning of the century, leverage ratios hovered 
between 5 and 6. After the creation of the Federal Reserve and during World War I, they 
rose to between 7 and 8. Prior to these events, state-bank leverage on average exceeded 
national-bank leverage. By the 1920s, national bank leverage exceeded state bank 
leverage, possibly because the Federal Reserve reduced liquidity risks for member banks. 
All national banks belonged to the Federal Reserve System while only a fraction of state-
chartered banks joined the system. Leverage falls during the contraction of the early 
1930s, but with the dissolution of double liability during the New Deal, it begins to rise. 
During World War II, leverage peaks at more than 17 for state banks and 20 for national 
banks. After the war, leverage falls gradually. The ratio then stabilizes at double the value 
prior to the start of the Great Depression.  
 Figure 3 displays the ratio of equity to total loans. This ratio reveals the 
percentage decline in the value of a bank’s loan portfolio that would exhaust its capital, 
force it into insolvency, and (in double liability states) trigger assessments on 
stockholders. It is meant to capture the default risk of a bank’s loan portfolio. Banks in 
the early twentieth century possessed large equity buffers. The figure suggests that, in 
1910, the average state bank would have remained solvent even if its loans lost one-third 
of its value or if one-third of their borrowers stopped repaying their loans. After the 
creation of the Federal Reserve, banks assumed greater lending risk and employed capital 
more intensively. After the collapse of the banking system in the 1930s, surviving banks 
became extremely conservative. In some years, the average bank could sustain losses of 
more than 40 percent of its loans and remain solvent. 
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 For a review of the concept of leverage, see Katia D’Hulster, “The Leverage Ratio: A New Binding 
Limit on Banks,” World Bank Note Number 11, December 2009. 
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 It represents the principal form of leverage available to commercial banks during the first half of the 
twentieth century. While most of the financial concepts, contracts, and organizations (such as mortgage 
backed securities and bank holding companies) that today enable financial institutions to increase exposure 
to risk and return also existed during the period that we study (in fact, many of these concepts were 
invented and popularized in the United States in the early twentieth century), regulations discouraged (and 
in many cases prohibited) commercial banks from employing these instruments before the 1980s. 
 14 
Retained earnings as a share of loans provides a measure that can be used to 
understand the losses on loans that would impair the average bank’s capital, absorb all of 
a bank’s retained earnings, and consume the value of its paid-in capital. If magnitude 
would likely threaten a bank’s ability to operate, scare potential creditors, and likely 
trigger regulatory intervention, including a forced merger with a healthier institution, 
requiring the bank to raise additional capital, or forced liquidation. In double-liability 
states, regulators could do this by imposing assessments up to the par value of 
outstanding stock. Figure 4 displays retained earnings as a share of loans. This ratio fell 
after the creation of the Federal Reserve in the 1910s and 1920s. It then rose substantially 
during the 1930s, partly as a reaction to rising risk and partly in response to legal changes 




The cash-to-asset ratio reveals the fraction of bank assets invested in extremely 
safe and liquid assets. Figure 5 shows the average cash-to-asset ratio, revealing the 
fraction of bank assets held in safe and liquid assets.
15
 Banks held proportionately more 
safe assets following the banking crises of the 1930s. Note that banks cash holdings at 
times varied for reasons beyond their control.
16
  
Figure 6 depicts the loan-to-asset ratio. During our sample period, commercial 
loans lent primarily to local businesses, and to a lesser extent, to individuals or on real 
estate. This ratio remained relatively steady until the 1930s and then declined rapidly as 
banks limited lending due to rising default risk. Banks shifted toward bonds, whose 
liquidity and high real yields in a deflationary environment appeared increasingly 
attractive (White, 2010; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate important aspects of the legislative reforms of the 1930s. 
These reforms, of course, provide the variation that is central to our panel regressions in 
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 To reiterate, in the 1930s almost all states that changed double liability laws did so by allowing banks to 
opt out of it or to retain double liability for their shareholders. The same was true for national banks. 
15
 Cash includes cash items (such as checks in the process of collection) and deposits at other banks 
(including reserves deposited in money center banks and Federal Reserve Banks). 
16
 All banks faced reserve requirements, which specified fractions of certain types of deposits that had to be 
held as cash in their vault or deposits at a private or Federal Reserve Bank. These requirements varied 
across time, states, cities (country, reserve, central reserve), and clearing houses. Policies of the Federal 
Reserve also influenced reserve balances, particularly the open-market operations and changes in reserve 
requirements during the 1930s. 
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the next section. Figure 7 indicates the assets of banks operating under different regimes 
for ending contingent liability. Figure 8 indicates the assets of banks required to either (1) 
join the FDIC or (2) increase surplus if they wished to opt out of double liability. These 
figures tell a consistent story. In most cases, eliminating double liability was part of a 
package of reforms that required banks to protect depositors’ interests by adding 
insurance, raising capital, or both. 
 
B. Panel Analysis 
Our empirical analysis examines whether key balance-sheet ratios, such as 
leverage, differed for banks in states with and without contingent liability.
17
 We begin 
with an assumption that a state banks’ balance sheet reflects market forces, state laws, 
and state economic conditions. Equation (1) summarizes this relationship. 
  
(1) S
it S it S it itS L X       , 
 
where i denotes state and t indicates the year. S is a state-bank balance sheet 
characteristic, such leverage. L are the laws of the state affecting state banks, including 
contingent liability, but in the later regressions, a vector of laws related to contingent 
liability and the conditions imposed on banks that opted for limited liability. X are 
economic conditions that influence banks’ behavior such as local business conditions, 
preferences for holding currency relative to deposits, investment returns, and changes in 
employment. 
 For the period of interest, consistent measures of state and local economic 
conditions (the X’s) do not exist.  Hence, to control for these factors, we exploit the fact 
that all national banks faced identical rules and regulations, regardless of their location in 
the U.S., but individually, were subjected to the same location-specific market and 
economic conditions that state banks faced. Equation (2) summarizes this relationship. 
 
(2) N
it N N it itN X     , 
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 For ease of exposition, any state without limited liability is defined as a “contingent liability” state. 
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using N as the same balance sheet characteristic we consider for state banks, but the state-
specific value for national banks. Solving equation (2) for X and substituting the result 
into (1) yields:  
 
(3)      /  / /  .it S S S S N S N NS N              
 
Equation 3 indicates how national bank outcomes can proxy for state-specific economic 
conditions that also influence state banks located in the same state i.
18
 Chung and 
Richardson (2007) discuss the potential bias caused by the correlation of the state and 
national bank error terms. In our specifications, such biases are minimal, and the 
direction of them works against our results.  
We thus estimate different specifications of the following equation: 
 
(4)   it it it itS L N       , 
 
where the coefficient β indicates how the behavior of state-chartered banks in a state 
differed from the behavior of nationally-charted banks in state i, (i.e., β = βS/βN). The 
constant indicates how average state-bank choices differed from average national bank 
choices, i.e. α = αS - αN/βN. Note that the constant could be disaggregated into state and 
year fixed effects by adding subscripts i and t. The regression thus examines how the 
behavior of state banks (the treated group, with respect to state banking laws) deviates 
from national banks (the control group not affected by state banking laws).  
 Table 2 examines how leverage is affected by bank liability laws. The dependent 
variable is the asset-to-equity ratio. Data are aggregated at the state level so that the 
dependent variable is the weighted average of the asset-equity ratio for all state-chartered 
banks in a state. Column (1) regresses the state leverage ratio on an indicator variable set 
equal to unity if the state possessed double liability as well as state and year fixed effects. 
The fixed effects control for changes in leverage ratios over time and for state specific 
effects correlated with liability laws of the states. Standard errors are calculated using the 
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 See Mitchener (2005, 2007). 
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Huber-White method, which generates consistent standard in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
19
 The coefficient reveals that, on average, 
leverage ratios in limited liability states exceeded leverage ratios in double liability states. 
The null hypothesis that leverage in limited liability states exceeded leverage in 
contingent liability states cannot be rejected at the one-percent level. The effect is also 
large in economic terms. During the 1920 and early 1930s, the average leverage ratio for 
all banks in the United States was around seven. The measured coefficient (-0.72) is 
roughly one-tenth of the average, and approximately equal to 70 percent of the capital of 
the average bank. In other words, our estimate indicates that the typical state-chartered 
bank with a capital of $50,000 and located in a limited liability state held about $36,000 
more in investments (assets) than an equivalent state-chartered bank located in a double-
liability state. To control for state-specific factors influencing bank leverage, column (2) 
adds the asset-equity ratio for national banks. Even after controlling for this influence, 
leverage ratios continue to be higher in limited liability states and lower in double 
liability states, about 50% (-0.495) of the capital of the average bank.  
Table 3 examines how the loan losses that a bank could absorb before becoming 
impaired or insolvent varied across states with different liability regimes. In Column (1), 
the dependent variable is average retained earnings as a fraction of loans for all state 
chartered banks in each state. This ratio indicates the losses that a bank could sustain on 
its loan portfolio before its capital became impaired – an event which typically triggered 
regulatory intervention. The independent variables include an indicator for double 
liability, the equivalent ratio for national banks in each state, and state and year fixed 
effects. The coefficient indicates that banks in states with double liability could sustain 
larger losses as a fraction of their portfolios before running out of retained earnings. The 
magnitude of the effect is substantial in economic terms. In the 1920s, retained earnings 
over loans averaged about 10 percent. The variance around this average was about 1.5 
percent. The coefficient of 0.682 indicates that double liability raised this ratio by about 
seven percent (i.e. from an average of approximately 9.65 to 10.35), and that double 
liability’s impact was large relative to the other factors generating variance in the data.    
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 We find similar results when we cluster the standard errors either by year or by year and region. 
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In Column (2), the dependent variable is the equity-loan ratio, which indicates the 
fraction of the loan portfolio that the average bank could lose before becoming insolvent. 
The independent variables include an indicator for double liability, the equivalent ratio 
for national banks in each state, and state and year fixed effects. The coefficient indicates 
that banks in states with double liability could sustain larger losses as a fraction of their 
portfolios before becoming insolvent. The coefficients from both columns indicate that 
banks in states with double liability converted each dollar of capital into few loans than 
banks in states with limited liability.
20
 The magnitude of this effect was substantial. In the 
1920s, the equity-loan ratio averaged about 20 percent. The variance was about 2 percent. 
The coefficient of 1.667 indicates that double liability raised this ratio by about eight 
percent (i.e. from an average of 19.2 to 20.8) and that double liability generated a large 
share of the variance in the data.  
Table 4 examines leverage in banks after the creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We use the same empirical strategy as the preceding 
tables, but limit the analysis to 1933-1955 in order to focus on the evolution of leverage 
since the New Deal. We include three additional indicator variables. The first indicates 
whether a state required banks that opted out of contingent liability to join the FDIC. The 
second indicates whether a state required banks that opted out of contingent liability to 
notify depositors before the change, and the third indicates where a state required banks 
that opted out of contingent liability to increase surplus (i.e. retain additional earnings). 
Column (1) shows that the leverage ratio of banks in states with contingent liability was 
about 3 percentage points lower than the leverage of banks in states with limited liability. 
During the 20 years following the banking holiday in 1933, the leverage of banks in 
states with contingent liability averaged about nine. The leverage ratio in states where 
banks could opt out of double liability averaged about 12.  
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 The results shown in Table 3 shed light on differences in the existing empirical literature. Previous 
scholars present regressions like ours, some possessing positive coefficients and others possessing negative 
coefficients (e.g. Vincens, 1957 and Esty,1998). Scholars note that their results depend upon their particular 
sample and specification. The results of contingent liability appear, in many cases, to vary over time 
(Grossman, 2001, 2007). Given the dramatic changes in the structure and performance of banks over time 
and across space, it is possible to pick samples (particular years or states) that generate almost any result. 
We believe that the panel structure of our analysis avoids potential pitfalls, by enabling us to calculate the 
average impact of contingent liability controlling for variation over time, space, and local economic 
conditions, and return to an explicit comparison with the existing literature in our robustness checks. 
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Leverage of banks required to join the FDIC moved in the other direction. The 
coefficient on the requirement to join the FDIC was 1.7. Controlling for local conditions, 
state fixed effects, and year fixed effects diminishes all of these coefficients. Column (3) 
shows that, with a full set of controls and robust standard errors, leverage increased by 
about 0.5 for banks that were required to join the FDIC. Leverage decreased by 0.5 in 
states where banks were required to increase equity when opting out of contingent 
liability. In states that required both membership in the FDIC and increased equity, the 
effects appear to have cancelled each other out, and average leverage did not change. 
These results suggest that a substantial share of the increase in leverage after the New 
Deal occurred because federal and state legislation swapped contingent liability for 
deposit insurance.  
 
C. Comparison with Prior Studies 
To put our results in some perspective, we relate them to previous empirical and 
theoretical studies, in particular, those of Grossman (2007) and Calomiris and Wilson 
(2004). Grossman (2007) argues that contingent liability reduced risk taking. We agree 
with that assessment, but our statistical results differ from that earlier paper in two 
important ways. First, we find the impact of double liability persists during the 1930s. 
Second, we observe a consistent and substantial relationship between higher contingent 
liability and lower leverage ratios, but find no statistically significant relationship 
between contingent liability and cash holdings (measured either as the cash-to-asset ratio 
or the cash-to-deposit ratio). Grossman (2007) finds the opposite statistical relationships.   
There are several reasons why our statistical results differ from Grossman (2007). 
Our study differs in terms of coverage across states and over time. In particular, the 
earlier study excludes several states because the author failed to locate information on 
contingent liability. Our empirical model also differs from Grossman (2007) in two key 
respects. Grossman (2007) includes the lagged value of the dependent variable as an 
independent variable and the estimates use transformed balance sheet ratios, computed as 
the natural log of the balance sheet ratio divided by one minus the ratio (i.e., ln(x/(1-x)).  
Table 5 indicates that differences between our analysis and the earlier study arise 
from both of these factors. Columns 1 and 4 of the table apply both of the Grossman 
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(2007) modeling assumptions to our data set for two balance-sheet measures: (1) the 
cash-deposit ratio and (2) the asset-equity ratio. Columns 2 and 5 only include the lagged 
dependent variable assumption, whereas columns 3 and 6 only include the log 
transformation assumption. Column (2) demonstrates that for the cash-to-deposit ratio, 
regressing on the lagged value of the dependent variable generates the difference between 
our result and the earlier study. Column (3) shows that Grossman’s transformation of the 
cash-to-deposit ratio alone does not generate his finding for the cash-deposit ratio. The 
results in Column (4) resemble the findings in Grossman (2007) for leverage, applying 
both assumptions. Column (5) demonstrates that, for leverage, adding the lagged value of 
the dependent variable does not generate this result. Column (6) suggests that that the 
difference in results arises from transforming the functional form of the balance sheet 
ratio.  
 Having established that the differences arise from statistical modeling choices, we 
suggest that our methods and data may be may be preferable. First, the transformation of 
balance sheet variables in Grossman (2007) seems arbitrary. Source documents and 
manuals by practitioners from the period show analyses conducted on the levels and 
differences of the data (Garcia, 1935). We use those variables in our study. We know of 
no contemporaneous sources that discussed data transformations like those used in 
Grossman (2007). Second, the transformation ln(x/(1-x)) is neither linear nor monotonic. 
It dramatically inflates differences between data points with low capital ratios (i.e., high 
leverage). Third, including the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side can lead 
to biased and inconsistent estimates. If there is no serial correlation, the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable will mean that OLS is biased but consistent (Keele and 
Kelly, 2006). However, if there is serial correlation, then the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable model will mean that OLS is both biased and inconsistent. 
Coefficients for the lagged dependent variable are usually inflated while coefficients for 
other explanatory variables are biased toward zero, making it harder to find a statistical 
relationship between the exogenous variables and the dependent variable. (Achen, 2000; 
Griliches, 1961; Hibbs, 1974, Maddala and Rao 1973; Malinvaud, 1970, Phillips and 
Wickens, 1978). Fourth, controlling for state and year fixed effects often yields 
biased results. 
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 Calomiris and Wilson (2004) argue that conditional liability could have 
increased leverage at banks because it protected depositors from losses and allowed 
banks to attract more deposits for any particular level of capital. This result arises 
because, in their model, all banks pay the same rate to depositors. Thus, banks 
compete for deposits based on the safety of their portfolios.  
In Table 7, we regress state-bank leverage on the array of explanatory 
variables that shape the behavior of banks in the Calomiris-Wilson model. We add 
the cash-to-asset and loan-to-asset ratios as measures of portfolio quality; average 
bank size as a measure of depositor risk and perhaps also ownership concentration; 
an indicator variable for years in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
operated; interactions between the indicator variables and average bank size; and 
the average cost of deposits and cost of capital for national banks in each state. 
Calomiris and Wilson’s model suggests that if we properly control for other balance 
sheet characteristics and institutional changes, then double liability should lead to 
more leverage (i.e. a higher asset/equity ratio) rather than less. Column (1) 
indicates that adding additional balance-sheet ratios (and other banks 
characteristics) as controls does not alter our result. This result remains robust to 
alternative regression specifications.  
Our results likely differ from those suggested by the Calomiris and Wilson 
because, for at least a part of our sample period, banks paid depositors different 
rates of interest and these rates varied geographically (and over time). Sometimes 
depositors moved funds to high-return, high-risk banks. In other times, depositors’ 
fears outweighed their greed, and they shifted funds towards low-risk banks. Banks 
that wanted to increase leverage likely did so by paying higher rates on deposits. We 
test this idea in columns (2) and (3) by adding to the Calomiris-Wilson specification 
the average cost of deposits and the cost of capital. Both are statistically significant 
and substantial in magnitude. On average, banks that increased interest to 
depositors by 1 percent increased their leverage ratio by 0.31.  
 Our results nevertheless can be reconciled with the Calomiris-Wilson model 
and their empirical interpretation of the 1930s “capital crunch.” The banking 
legislation of 1933 and 1935 prohibited banks from paying interest on demand 
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deposits. After that point in time, the Federal Reserve member banks in New York 
City (which are the subset that Calomiris and Wilson examine) did not compete on 
price for commercial and interbank deposits. In this place and period, banks 
behaved as predicted by the Calomiris-Wilson model. 
 
V. Implications and Conclusion 
Some commentators have argued that the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act 
permitted Wall Street investment banking firms to gamble with their depositors' money 
that was held in affiliated commercial banks.
21
 These criticisms may, in part, miss the 
mark as they deflect attention from how the passage of Glass Steagall and the Banking 
Act of 1935 all but eliminated contingent liability for commercial banks and significantly 
altered the landscape for risk taking by the financial industry.  
Our statistical results indicate that eliminating contingent liability increased risk 
taking by bankers – a shield that had provided some protection to depositors for three 
quarters of a century. A system that had led banks to leverage less and close earlier when 
they were losing money was “replaced” by Congress with deposit insurance, stricter 
regulation of lending and borrowing practices for banks, and beefed up capital 
requirements. In place of contingent liability, Congress substituted deposit insurance and 
strengthened bank capital. It has been well documented that the introduction of federal 
deposit insurance removed the incentive for most depositors to monitor banks, and 
introduced moral hazard (Calomiris, 1990; Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002).  
The net result of these changes was to take the monitoring of risk out of banks’ 
hands and place it in the governments’ hands. Deposit insurance required the FDIC to 
ensure that banks’ contributions to the deposit insurance fund were weighted according to 
risk, and to have faith in the FDIC’s ability to understand and monitor bank risk taking. 
Lending and borrowing restrictions meant that examiners had to carefully examine 
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balance sheets to ensure compliance, but with government agencies serving as the 
backstops for the banking system, this created incentives for banks to take on additional 
risks or “game the system” by making their portfolios difficult to monitor.  
New Deal banking reforms had other unintended consequences that affected risk 
taking. For example, even without deposit insurance, the decision by policymakers to 
marginalize bank liability and elevate the importance of capital and surplus effectively 
shifted the burden of monitoring banks to regulators. Liability requirements are 
straightforward, requiring little oversight. Capital requirements, on the other hand, place 
demands on regulators to verify balance sheet particulars with regularity, and then report 
these publicly to achieve market discipline. Executing this task, however, is complicated 
by reporting standards (marking to market versus book value) and the opacity of many 
types of assets. Banks have become increasingly adept at satisfying regulatory capital by 
shifting assets “off the balance sheet.” Regulators struggle to maintain compliance and 
ensure banks have “skin in the game,” but banks today seem more than capable of 
amassing risk despite capital regulation.  
Other features of New Deal legislation likely reinforced risk taking by financial 
firms. For example, the Glass-Steagall Act created a firewall between investment banking 
and commercial banking, and eliminated the ability for commercial banks to carry as 
brokerages and underwrite securities.
22
 Large financial firms of the period, like J.P. 
Morgan, were forced to change their business model in order to comply. Federal bank 
regulators thus came to view the investment banks as outside their regulatory and 
supervisory domain, and no new agency was created to manage directly the risk taking of 
investment banks. Partnerships had traditionally provided a mechanism for restraint and 
self control of investment banks, and external oversight potentially provided a way to 
reinforce prudent behavior. However, by the 1970s, neither of these conditions existed. 
Almost all the major American investment banks began to raise funds through stock 
issuance (abandoning the partnership model) and direct their managers to pursue 
objectives that responded to outside shareholders. With access to public markets, 
investment banks could more easily acquire funds and their increase leverage. Glass 
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Steagall thus had the unintended consequence of moving investment banks beyond the 
purview of bank regulators, shifting oversight to the S.E.C., an agency created in the 
1930s to regulate securities markets but given little if any mandate to oversee other types 
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Changes After 1910   
Requirements for Termination of Double Liability 
Begin 
Eliminate Liability 
for …. Stock 
 
New Existing   






Six month notice, and retain earnings until surplus 
equals capital. 
        
1 Arizona Limited 1912 1956 1956  Join FDIC. 
2 Arkansas Limited 1912 1933 1935  Join FDIC. 
3 California Unlimited  1937 1937  Join FDIC and six month notice. 
4 Colorado Triple  1939 1939  Join FDIC. 
5 Florida Double  1937 1937  Join FDIC; surplus must equal capital. 
6 Georgia Double  1937 1937  Stockholders remain liable for unpaid stock. No 
new protections. 
7 Idaho Double  1923 1923   
8 Illinois Double  1952 1953   
9 Indiana Double  1940 1941  Five month notice for shares issued before 
December 1940. 
10 Iowa Double  1933 1938   
        
11 Kansas Double  1937 1937  Six month notice for shares issued before 23 
March 1937. 
12 Kentucky Double  1937 1937  Six month notice. Accumulate additional surplus 
(a). 
13 Maine Double  1933 1933  Bank stock issued before 16 December 1933 
exempt if surplus equals capital, else stockholders 
liable for amount capital exceeds surplus.  
14 Maryland Double  1937 1937  Three month notice; exempt banks must annually 
transfer 10% of earnings to surplus until surplus 
equals capital. 
15 Massachusetts Double  1934 1934  Six month notice for stock issued before 1 June 
1934. Accumulate additional surplus (a). 
16 Michigan Double  1937 1937  30 days’ notice. Accumulate additional surplus 
(a). 
17 Minnesota Double     Join FDIC. 
18 Mississippi Limited 1914 1934 1934  Join FDIC and six month notice for stock issued 
before 24 Oct 1933 
19 Montana Double  1936 1936  Join FDIC. 
20 Nebraska Double  1938 1938   
        
        
        
        






Changes After 1910   
Requirements for Termination of Double Liability 
Begin 
Eliminate Liability 
for …. Stock 
 
New Existing   
        
        
        
21 Nevada Limited 1911 1933 1933   
22 New Hampshire Limited 1911 1937 1937  Six month notice on stock issued before 1 Jan 
1911 or after 1 Jun 1937. 
23 New Mexico Double  1935 1935   
24 New York Double  1937 1937  Six month notice. Minimum surplus raised to 65% 
from 20% of capital. 
 
25 North Carolina Double  1935 1935  Surplus equal to 50% of capital must be invested 
in state or US government bonds; if deficiency, 
stockholders liable. 
26 North Dakota Double  1939 1939  Six month notice. 
27 Ohio Double  1937 1937  Stockholders liable for unpaid stock. No new 
protections. 
28 Oklahoma Double  1937 1937  Join FDIC, three month notice. Stock issued after 
28 April 1937 exempt. 
29 Oregon Limited 1912     
30 Pennsylvania Double  1939 1939  Limited liability on shares issued after 1 Sept 
1939. Other shares double liable if surplus below 
capital. After 1 July 1941, double liability ceases 
on six-month notice. 
        
31 South Carolina Double  1935 1935  Except for banks judged insolvent before 21 
September 1935. Accumulate additional surplus 
(a). 
32 South Dakota Double  1936 1936  Join FDIC. For non-members, double liability 
continues for 1 year after transfer of shares. 
33 Texas Double  1937 1937   
34 Utah Double  1940 1940   
35 Vermont Double  1933   Shares issued prior to 24 March 1933 remain 
doubly liable. 
36 Washington Double  1940 1940  Join FDIC or furnish security of payment 
equivalent to that required by national banks. 
37 West Virginia Double  1938 1938  Join FDIC or surplus equal 50% capital, and three 
months' notice. 
38 Wisconsin Double  1937 1937  Join FDIC. Six month notice. 
39 Wyoming Double  1937 1937  Join FDIC. 60 days’ notice. 
                
 
Notes: (a) Source appears to indicate 'accumulate surplus equal to capital' but exact amount of 




Table 2: Leverage and Stockholder Liability with and without Double Liability 
Dependent Variable: Average state bank asset-equity ratio 
    
Independent Variable   
   
Double Liability  -0.720*** -0.495*** 
 (0.150) (0.132) 
   
National Bank Assets to Equity Ratio  0.709*** 
  (0.030) 
   
Constant 4.086*** 1.583*** 
 (0.371) (0.295) 
   
Observations 2208 2208 
R-squared 0.81 0.88 
   
 
Notes: *** indicate significant at 1%. All specifications estimated with state and year fixed effects. Huber–
White robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable is the sum of assets in all state-
chartered banks in each state in each year divided by the sum of equity, defined as paid-up capital (common 
and preferred stock), surplus, undivided profits, unpaid dividends, and all other retained earnings. 
Independent variable is the equivalent value for the nationally-chartered banks within each state. 
  
 32 
Table 3: Contingent Liability and Loan Losses before Impairment or Insolvency 
    
 Dependent Variable 
 Retained Earnings/Loans Equity/Loans 
Independent Variable   
   
Double Liability  0.682** 1.667*** 
 (0.310) (0.450) 
   
National Bank Ratio 0.519*** 0.538*** 
 (0.038) (0.030) 
   
Constant 4.948*** 14.187*** 




Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 2208 2208 
R-squared 0.84 0.78 
   
 
Notes: ** indicates significance at 5% level. *** indicates significant at 1% level. Huber-White standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. All specifications estimated with state and year fixed effects. Observations 
exist for each state for each year from 1910 through 1955. In column (1), the dependent variable is the sum 
of retained earnings in all state-chartered banks in each state in each year divided by the sum of total loans 
at all state-chartered banks in each year. In column (2), the dependent variable is the sum of capital and 
retained earnings divided by the sum of loans. In each column, the independent variable is the equivalent 




Table 4: Leverage and Requirements for Opting Out of Double Liability 
.     
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Assets / Capital 
    
Double Liability  -2.999 -0.594 -0.317 
 (0.306)*** (0.287)** (0.224) 
    
Requirements for Opting Out of Double Liability    
    
Join FDIC 1.740 0.833 0.566 
 (0.329)*** (0.318)*** (0.239)** 
    
Notice  -0.572 -0.433 0.043 
 (0.314) (0.309) (0.260) 
    
Increase Surplus  -0.165 -1.280 -1.228 
 (0.331) (0.340)*** (0.301)*** 
    
National Bank Retained Earnings to Loans   0.543 
   (0.036)*** 
    
Constant 12.303 5.650 1.927 
 (0.194)*** (0.413)*** (0.417)*** 
 
 
   
Year Fixed Effects  yes yes 
State Fixed Effects  yes yes 
Robust Standard Errors  yes yes 
Observations 1104 1056 1056 
R-squared 0.13 0.87 0.91 
    
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors calculated using Huber-White Sandwich 
Method. Asterisk ** indicates significant at 5%; Two asterisks *** indicate significant at 1%. Observations 
exist for each state for each year from 1910 through 1955. Dependent variable is the sum of retained 
earnings (including surplus, undivided profits, unpaid dividends, and all other retained earnings) in all 
state-chartered banks in each state in each year divided by the sum of total loans at all state-chartered banks 
in each year. Independent variable is the equivalent value for the nationally-chartered banks within each 
state.  
 
Table 5. Regression Specifications Using Alternative Functional Form and Lagged Dependent Variables 
 
 Dependent Variable and Functional Form 
 Cash to Deposit Ratio  Asset to Equity Ratio 
Independent 
Variable 
ln(x/(1-x)) X ln(x/(1-x))  ln(x/(1-x)) x ln(x/(1-x)) 
        
Double 
Liability  
0.025 0.003 -0.152  0.014 -0.280 0.390 
(0.007)** (0.001)* (0.027)**  (0.005)** (0.047)** (0.018)** 




0.882 0.943   0.854 0.954  
(0.007)** (0.007)**   (0.007)** (0.006)**  
        
National Bank 
Analog of DV 
0.214    0.123   
(0.012)**    (0.007)**   
        
Constant 0.040 0.010 -1.263  -0.062 0.741 -2.231 
 (0.010)** (0.002)** (0.020)**  (0.012)** (0.072)** (0.013)** 
        
Observations 2160 2160 2208  2160 2160 2208 
R-squared 0.94 0.90 0.01  0.96 0.94 0.17 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk * indicates significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Alternative Specifications Incorporating the Calomiris-Wilson Model 
 
 Dependent Variable 
State Bank Leverage Ratio 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Double Liability (DL) -0.625 -1.850 -1.737 
 (0.158)** (0.322)** (0.319)** 
DL * FDIC 0.344 -0.066 0.020 
 (0.205) (0.458) (0.452) 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) -0.063 -1.050 -0.987 
 (0.442) (0.442)* (0.436)* 
National Bank (NB) Average Size 0.262 -45.835 -45.432 
 (0.371) (7.752)** (7.651)** 
National Bank Leverage 0.687 0.427 0.412 
 (0.033)** (0.032)** (0.032)** 
National Bank Cash/Asset Ratio -1.853 8.298 8.663 
 (1.229) (1.287)** (1.272)** 
National Bank Loan/Asset Ratio -2.755 0.680 0.201 
 (0.897)** (0.725) (0.722) 
DL * NB Average Size  41.699 40.379 
  (7.632)** (7.537)** 
FDIC * NB Average Size  11.468 12.279 
  (8.997) (8.881) 
DL * FDIC * * NB Average Size  -8.453 -8.580 
  (9.772) (9.643) 
NB Cost of Deposits  27.845 31.644 
  (11.689)* (11.563)** 
NB Cost of Capital   7.407 
   (1.574)** 
    
Observations 2208 2208 2208 
R-squared 0.88 0.85 0.85 
 














1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
Year
State Assets/Equity National Assets/Equity
Notes: Aggregate ratio for each state averaged over states. State A/E is ratio for state banks.
National is ratio for national banks.




































1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
Year
State Bank Equity/Loan National Bank Equity/Loan
Aggregate ratio for each state averaged over states.
Source: All Bank Statistics
Equity/Loan Ratio for State and National Banks
























1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
Year
State Bank Surplus/Loan National Bank Surplus/Loan
Aggregate ratio for each state averaged over states
Source: All Bank Statistics
Retained Earnings/Loan Ratio for State and National Banks










1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
Year
State Bank Cash/Asset National Bank Cash/Asset
Aggregate ratio for each state averaged over states
Source: All Bank Statistics





1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
Year
State Bank Loan/Asset National Bank Loan/Asset
Aggregate ratio for each state averaged over states
Source: All Bank Statistics



































Note: Values are the sum of assets of all banks, both national and state, operating
under each rule.Total is total asset of all banks in US.
Source: Asset data from All Bank Statistics. Legal data see text.
Figure 7: Requirements for Opting Out of Double Liability
























1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955
Year
Total Assets All US Banks FDIC or Surplus
Values are the sum of assets of all banks, both national and state, operating under the rule.
Total is total asset of all banks in US.
Source: Asset data from All Bank Statistics. Legal data see text.
Figure 8: Requirements for Opting Out of Double Liability
Join FDIC or Increase Surplus
